We quantify the impact of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on US equity prices, as well as on the risk indicators of credit and CDS spreads, implied volatilities and US equity index risk reversals. We …nd that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements at the zero lower bound led to a signi…cant increase in US equity prices, for an aggregate equity index as well as for US commercial bank and US non-…nancial equities. Moreover, we …nd that they led to a signi…cant reduction in some credit spreads. They also led to a signi…cant reduction in an implied volatility index for US government bonds, as well as in the absolute value of US equity risk reversals, implying a lower perceived risk attached to a large fall in the equity index.
Introduction
With reaching the zero lower bound on the policy interest rate in the wake of the global …nancial crisis, explicit policy rate guidance has become an important unconventional monetary policy tool for the FOMC, in addition to large-scale asset purchases. In the words of the Federal Reserve's Vice Chair Janet Yellen, "Of course, many central banks have, in the wake of the crisis, found it challenging to provide appropriate monetary stimulus after their policy interest rate hit the e¤ective lower bound. This is the point where "many instruments" enters the discussion. The main tools for the FOMC have been forward guidance on the future path of the federal funds rate and large-scale asset purchases." (Yellen (2013) ). An aim of such forward guidance is to stimulate growth by increasing asset prices. "The objective of forward guidance is to a¤ect expectations about how long the highly accommodative stance of the policy interest rate will be maintained as conditions improve. By lowering private-sector expectations of the future path of shortterm rates, this guidance can reduce longer-term interest rates and also raise asset prices, in turn, stimulating aggregate demand." (Yellen (2013) ). The European Central Bank introduced explicit policy rate guidance in July 2013 (Draghi (2013) ). The ECB's President Draghi commented on this introduction in the question & answer session following the press conference as follows, "The Governing Council has taken the unprecedented step of giving forward guidance in a rather more speci…c way than it ever has done in the past.
In my statement, I said "The Governing Council expects the key. . . " -i.e. all interest rates -". . . ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time." It is the …rst time that the Governing Council has said something like this." (Draghi (2013) ). The Bank of England introduced explicit policy rate guidance in August 2013, including in its news release "In particular, the MPC intends not to raise Bank Rate from its current level of 0.5% at least until the Labour Force Survey headline measure of the unemployment rate has fallen to a threshold of 7%, subject to the conditions below." Kozicki et al. (2011) ). Rosa (2011) …nds that the Federal Reserve's Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) were successful in boosting US equity prices, considering the S&P 500 equity index, and also presents an overview of the literature on the e¤ects of LSAPs. Neely (2010) …nds some evidence that for 4 of 5 LSAP buy announcements considered, equity prices were either clearly up over the window or mixed, also considering the S&P 500 equity index. Gagnon et al. (2011) …nd that reductions in longer-term interest rates due to LSAPs primarily re ‡ected lower risk premia, including term premia, rather than lower expectations of future short-term interest rates. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) …nd for the Federal Reserve's …rst Quantitative Easing programme (QE1) that a Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) risk premium channel operated that lowered yields on MBSs; they also …nd that a default risk or default risk premium channel operated that reduced yields on corporate bonds. Hattori et al. (2013) …nd that FOMC balance sheet policy announcements led to a signi…cant reduction in the absolute value of risk reversals on the S&P 500 equity index.
Explicit policy rate guidance at the zero lower bound can lead to higher equity prices and lower risk measures by leading to lower long-term real interest rates. Lower long-term real interest rates can lead to higher equity prices due to their use for discounting equity prices, and by increasing expectations of growth and thereby of corporate earnings. They can also lead to higher equity prices since in a search for yield, …xed income investors with given nominal return goals may move into riskier equities (Rajan (2013) ). Lower longterm real interest rates can also lead to lower risk measures, such as lower credit spreads on advanced economy high-yield bonds or emerging market bonds, by improving mean growth expectations, as well as by a¤ecting the lower tail of the expected distribution of growth expectations, reducing some perceived downside risks. Moreover, in their search for yield …xed income investors may also move to riskier instruments such as junk bonds or emerging market bonds (Rajan (2013) ). Easy availability of borrowing at low interest rates can reduce risk perceptions and risk measures, such as the VIX volatility index, by increasing asset prices, increasing bank capitalisation and reducing perceived leverage (Rajan (2013) ). Galati and Moessner (2011) review the literature on the related risk-taking channel of monetary policy, on which the following is based. Borio and Zhu (2008) In this paper we quantify the impact of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on equity prices, as well as on the risk indicators of credit and CDS spreads, implied volatilities and equity index risk reversals. We …nd that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements led to a signi…cant increase in US equity prices, for an aggregate equity index as well as for US bank and US non-…nancial equities. Moreover, we …nd that they led to a signi…cant reduction in some credit spreads. They also led to a signi…cant reduction in an implied volatility index for US government bonds, as well as in US equity risk reversals.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the data, section 3 presents the method and section 4 the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 5 
Data
In this section we present the asset prices on which we study the e¤ect of FOMC policy rate guidance. For US equity prices, we consider the S&P 500 equity index, as well as bank equity prices (a simple average across the major US banks Bank of America, Citigroup, We also consider implied volatility measures on G7 currencies and on Emerging Market currencies. These implied volatility measures are shown in Figure 4 .
[ Figure 4 about here]
In addition to symmetric risk measures in the form of implied volatilities, related to the second moment of the implied probability distribution, we also consider an asymmetric risk measure related to the third moment of the implied probability distibution, namely risk reversals. We consider the absolute value of the 25-delta risk reversal of 2-month options on the S&P 500 index, as used in Hattori et al. (2013) . It re ‡ects the perceived risk of a strong fall in the equity index. A higher absolute value of the risk reversal re ‡ects a greater perceived risk of a large fall in the index. (Table 1) . 1 After a new wording of the FOMC's explicit policy rate guidance was introduced, for example that the FOMC "anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period", this or a similar wording was repeated in subsequent FOMC statements, until it was changed for a new wording. To capture the surprise component of the statements, we only consider those dates, given in Table 1 , when a new wording was introduced, not those when a previous wording was repeated. As in Moessner (2013), we consider new explicit policy rate guidance from the time after the zero lower bound on policy rates had been reached on 16 December 2008 , that is when the policy rate remained unchanged, so that we avoid confusion with the e¤ect from an actual change in the fed funds target rate.
We therefore exclude the new guidance associated with the establishment of the target range for the federal funds rate of 0-0.25% on 16 December 2008, since it was associated with a reduction of the target for the federal funds rate from its previous value of 1%.
[ Table 1 about here] 1 See FOMC statements on the dates speci…ed. 7 
Method
We regress daily changes in asset prices, y(t), on a dummy variable for the announcements of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance, d P RG (t), and on the surprise components of 11 US macroeconomic data releases, surprise j (t), j = 1; :::; 11, to control for the e¤ects of economic data, following the approach of Moessner (2013) who studied the e¤ect of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance on interest rate expectations. The daily change can be de…ned as either the di¤erence y(t) = a y(t) = y(t) y(t 1), or as the percentage change r y(t) = (y(t) y(t 1))=y(t 1) 100, depending on the asset price considered.
The regression equation takes the form
where d P RG (t) takes the value of 1 on days when the FOMC provided new explicit policy rate guidance after the zero lower bound on the policy rate had been reached, as listed in Table 1 , and zero otherwise. 2 We use Newey-West adjusted standard errors.
On some dates the FOMC's explicit policy rate guidance coincided with the FOMC's announcements regarding asset purchases as part of the …rst Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programme (LSAP1), LSAP2, the Maturity Extension Program (MEP) and LSAP3 (see Hofmann and Zhu (2013) ). We therefore also estimate the e¤ect of explicit policy rate guidance separately for those announcements where it was not associated with asset purchase announcements, d
nap P RG (t), and those where it was associated with asset purchase announcements, d wap P RG (t),
The dummy variable d 
Results
In this section we present results for the e¤ects of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance on US equity prices, on credit spreads and CDS spreads, on uncertainty/risk measures in the form of implied volatilities, and on risk indicators in the form of US equity index risk reversals.
E¤ect on equity prices
We …rst present the results for estimating equation (1) for daily percentage changes in equity prices, for the S&P 500 equity index, as well as for …nancial and non-…nancial equity indices. We can see from Table 2 that the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable for explicit policy rate guidance announcements is signi…cantly positive at the 1% level for the S&P 500, and at the 5% level for US bank equities and non-…nancial equities. The coe¢ cient is largest for US bank equities at 4.0, that is explicit policy rate guidance announcements lead to equity price changes which are on average 4 percentage points higher than on other days, and smallest for non-…nancial equities, at 1.6, with the coe¢ cient for the S&P 500 index lying in between these two values, at 1.9.
We therefore …nd evidence that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance has raised asset prices, which was one of its aims as suggested by Yellen (2013) . These results are consistent with the results of Moessner (2013) that the FOMC's explicit policy rate guidance led to lower government bond yields for a range of maturities. As discussed in section 1, the increase in equity prices could be due to lower long-term interest rates being used to discount equity prices or leading to a search for yield, or due to higher growth expectations.
E¤ect on credit spreads and CDS spreads
We next study the e¤ect of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements on credit spreads. We …nd that they led to a signi…cant reduction in North American high-yield, North American investment-grade and Emerging market credit spreads, at the 1% signi…-cance level. By contrast, European high-yield credit spreads even increased slightly ( Table   4 ). The reduction was largest for North American high-yield credit spreads, at 27 basis points, followed by Emerging market credit spreads at 9 basis points, and North American investment-grade credit spreads at 4 basis points. When we distinguish whether explicit policy rate guidance announcements were associated with asset purchase announcements or not, we …nd that the dummy variables remain signi…cantly negative in both cases for these three spreads, although the signi…cance of the coe¢ cients is reduced in two cases (Table 5 ). The reduction in credit spreads could be due to lower long-term real rates leading to higher mean growth expectations and a lower probability being assigned to very negative growth outcomes, as well as to a search for yield and reductions in risk perceptions following the policy rate guidance, as discussed in section 1.
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here] We go on to study the e¤ect of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance on US sovereign and bank CDS spreads. Results are shown in Table 6 . We …nd no signi…cant coe¢ cient for the dummy variable when including all announcements. But for policy rate guidance not associated with asset purchase announcements, the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable is signi…cantly negative at 12 basis points for US bank CDS spreads.
[ Table 6 about here]
E¤ect on implied volatilities
The results for the e¤ect of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance on implied volatilities of equities, bonds and exchange rates are shown in Tables 7 and 8 . We …nd that the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable for all explicit policy rate guidance announcements is signi…cant at the 10% level only for the MOVE volatility index, that is related to government bonds, with policy rate guidance announcements leading to a reduction in implied volatility (Table 7 ). This could re ‡ect reduced uncertainty about the future path of the policy rate due to the policy rate guidance, as well as reduced risk perceptions. By contrast, it is not signi…cant for the implied volatility indices for equities, G7 currencies and Emerging Market currencies. One might expect the implied volatility of government bond yields to be more a¤ected by forward guidance than that of equities and exchange rates from its e¤ect of reducing uncertainty about future policy rates.
We also …nd that policy rate guidance announcements not associated with asset purchase announcements led to a signi…cant reduction (at the 1% level) in the implied volatility indices for government bonds (MOVE) and for G7 currencies, but not for the implied volatility indices for equities and Emerging Market currencies (Table 8) .
[ Tables 7 and 8 about here]
E¤ect on equity index risk reversals
We …nally study the e¤ect of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance not just on the second moment (volatility) of the implied probability distribution, but also on risk reversals related to the third moment of the implied distribution of expected equity prices. A larger absolute value of the 25-delta risk reversal re ‡ects a greater probability being assigned by market participants to a large fall in the equity index than to a large rise relative to the expected mean. We consider the e¤ect on daily percentage changes of the absolute value of 25-delta risk reversals of the S&P 500 index. Results are shown in Table 9 . We …nd that while the dummy variable for all explicit policy rate guidance announcements is not signi…cant, the dummy variable for explicit policy rate guidance announcements not associated with asset purchase announcements is signi…cant at the 1% level, with 11 an announcement leading to a reduction of 7% on average of the absolute value of the 25-delta risk reversal, that is reducing the perceived risk attached to a large fall in the equity index. This reduction could be due to lower longer-term real rates leading to higher growth expectations, with a lower probability being assigned by market participants to a large reduction in growth and therefore corporate earnings, as well as due to reduced risk perceptions.
[ Table 9 about here]
Conclusions
We quanti…ed the impact of explicit FOMC policy rate guidance used as an unconventional monetary policy tool at the zero lower bound of the policy rate on US equity prices, as well as on the risk indicators of credit and CDS spreads, implied volatilities and US equity index risk reversals. We found that explicit FOMC policy rate guidance announcements at the zero lower bound of the policy rate led to a signi…cant increase in US equity prices, for an aggregate equity index as well as for US bank and US non-…nancial equities. Moreover, we found that they led to a signi…cant reduction in some credit spreads (namely in North American high-yield and investment grade, and in Emerging Market credit spreads). They also led to a signi…cant reduction in an implied volatility index for US government bonds, as well as a reduction in the absolute value of US equity risk reversals, implying a lower perceived risk attached to a large fall in the equity index. […] the Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.
August 2011
The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013. 25 January 2012
[…] the Committee […] currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. 13 September 2012
[…] the Committee […] currently anticipates that exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015. 12 December 2012
[…] the Committee […] currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee's 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.
[…] a Based on FOMC press releases.
b From FOMC press releases. 
